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Zusammenfassung
Bildung, Ehe und Arbeit: das Dilemma mo-
derner katarischer Frauen
Anhand zweier Datensätze von Interviews, 
die mit katarischen Studentinnen und Profes-
sorinnen durchgeführt wurden, werden die 
Hindernisse auf dem Weg hin zu einer ge-
schlechterinklusiven Erwerbsbeteiligung un-
tersucht. Der erste Datensatz ist das Ergeb-
nis eines Projekts, das die Disparitäten zwi-
schen Bildungsabschluss und Erwerbsbetei-
ligung unter katarischen Frauen untersucht. 
274 junge Frauen im Alter von 17 bis 25 
Jahren wurden mit dem Ziel befragt, einige 
der Gründe nachzuzeichnen, warum katari-
sche Frauen nicht ins Berufsleben treten. Der 
zweite Datensatz bündelt die Ergebnisse von 
350 Fokusgruppendiskussionen und Inter-
views mit Studentinnen. Hier wurde die Aus-
wirkung von deren höherer Bildung auf de-
ren Heiratsfähigkeit untersucht. Ihre Bildung 
hat – im Vergleich zu den Generationen ihrer 
Mütter und Großmütter – zu einer Erhöhung 
des Heiratsalters geführt, aber die sozialen 
Erwartungen an Frauen, die Rolle der Ehe-
frau und Mutter zu erfüllen, führen weiterhin 
dazu, dass eine Heirat die Arbeit einer Frau 
außerhalb des Hauses einschränken kann.
Schlüsselwörter 
Frauen, Geschlechternormen, Ehe, Heirat, 
Golf von Arabien
Summary
We offer observations about the obstacles to 
promoting a gender-inclusive labor force 
based on two sets of data on female Qatari 
students and professionals. Data set 1 is the 
result of a project pertaining to the disparity 
between education and employment among 
Qatari women. We surveyed 274 young 
women between the ages of 17 and 25 with 
the aim of understanding some of the reasons 
why Qatari women were not entering the 
workforce. Data set 2 derives from 350 focus 
groups and interviews with female students 
to assess the effect their tertiary education 
had on their marriageability. While education 
has delayed the age of marriage when this 
generation of women is compared with that 
of their mothers and grandmothers, the social 
expectations of becoming a wife and ensuing 
motherhood mean that marriage can restrict 
a woman’s working outside the home.
Keywords 
women, gender norms, marriage, Arabian 
Gulf
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1 Education, Marriage, and Work: The Modern Qatari 
Woman’s Dilemma1, 2
The rapid economic development of the rentier states in the Arabian Gulf raises an array 
of social and cultural questions regarding the relevance of traditional values for contem-
porary Gulf societies. Oil wealth has afforded unique economic and political stability 
in the Middle East for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which includes Kuwait, 
Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. A high standard 
of living is accompanied by the conspicuous consumption of Western products. Indoor 
ski slopes exist in a desert climate where pearl diving was once the main industry and 
the Indian rupee was the main currency. Prior to the discovery of oil, schooling in GCC 
countries consisted of boys learning to read and write in Qur’an classes held in mosques. 
Girls of wealthier families were privately tutored in their homes by Islamic scholars. In 
Qatar, the first formal boys’ schools opened in 1948, offering a curriculum of Islamic 
studies, Islamic history, math, geography, English, and Arabic (Al-Kobaisi 1979: 34). 
The discovery of oil in the region in the 1970s transformed these national economies 
on account of their focusing exclusively on the petrochemical industry. Developments 
in the petroleum sector triggered simultaneous projects offshore and on the fringes of 
capital cities such as Doha, Qatar. Most GCC rulers created welfare states, offering their 
citizens free health care, education, water, and electricity, paid for by the exponential 
budget surpluses from the newfound oil wealth. Mehran Kamrava (2013: 35) explains 
how these funds were used to
“invest substantial sums in human development, most notably tertiary education, health care, and 
the fostering of knowledge-based economies in preparation for the post-oil period. Perhaps the most 
dramatic example of this type of investment has been in the establishment of new universities, or the 
attraction of branch campuses, which resulted in the growth of universities in the GCC from 1 in the 
1950s (in Saudi Arabia) to 13 in the 1970s, 29 in the 1980s, 40 in the 1990s, and 117 in the 2000s, an 
increase of over 290 percent in a decade.”
This early stage of national development focused on infrastructure expansion rather 
than changes to the social order. Traditional Gulf social conservatism persisted despite 
meteoric economic growth, which was accompanied by increased interaction with other 
countries and a variety of contemporary lifestyles. In Qatar: A Modern History, Allen 
Fromherz (2012) juxtaposes Qatar’s rapid economic development with a lack of social 
change as unique among nation-building developmental trajectories.  
Economic change is often a catalyst for social change, as seen in the way social 
mobility in Britain was made possible by the Industrial Revolution. Yet, Qatar’s change 
in economic circumstances did not mirror such social transformation. While Qatar’s 
economic investment in infrastructure projects has ushered in unprecedented opportuni-
ties for its citizens and – through necessity – embedded them in global networks, these 
projects are intended first and foremost to build and strengthen its domestic situation 
rather than cultivate a new generation of cosmopolitan actors. In fact, the increased 
1 Study 1 discussed in this article was made possible by a grant from the Undergraduate Research 
Experience Program as part of the Qatar National Research Forum. 
2 Interview protocols cited in this article were approved by the Qatar IRB Board IRB HM20001017.
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visibility of an affluent and cosmopolitan Qatari elite corresponds with a number of 
measures that have been implemented to keep Qatari values intact.3 Despite their global 
commercial acumen and involvement in transnational ventures, Qataris are making a 
concerted effort to preserve their culture and adhere to traditional expectations. Feminist 
scholar of Arab studies Miriam Cooke (2014: 16) draws attention to the pace of change 
and generational differences: 
“Sons and daughters of illiterate parents have been catapulted into a new world of global business, 
culture, and politics. Skipping over the Gutenberg Revolution, they have jumped directly from orality to 
IT literacy, from the tribal to the modern, and in the process have combined them.” 
Cooke’s description of the mercurial trajectory of change in the Gulf highlights the 
economic disparity between the GCC countries and their close Arab neighbors such as 
Egypt, Lebanon, or Syria. Socially, however, Gulf society mirrors much of the rest of 
the Arab world in the expectation that “a woman will marry early; her contribution to the 
family will be as homemaker; [while] the man leads, financially supports and protects 
his household” (OECD/CAWTAR 2014: 120). The insistence on gender segregation in 
schools, the workplace, and social life further separates Gulf societies from the more 
mingled social orders in the Middle East region. What effect does such rapid economic 
modernization within a conservative society have on female citizens? To what degree 
does an increase in wealth and access to higher education afford women more agency in 
their personal and professional lives? We examine these questions against the backdrop 
of arranged marriage practices and university education in the emirate of Qatar.
Since gaining independence from the British in 1971, the advances in modern Qatari 
women’s autonomy are promising yet remain framed by widely accepted patriarchal no-
tions of gender roles. Gender and modernization for female Qataris is a delicate balance 
between access to education, hopes of professionalization, and the unavoidable obliga-
tion to become a wife and mother. While petroleum wealth have made conspicuous con-
sumption of Western material luxuries a part of everyday Qatari life, traditional gender 
roles and expectations undergird this higher standard of living. Although the physical 
tasks expected of Qatari women have changed, attitudes to their role as wives and moth-
ers have not: “[W]hereas Bedouin women worked with their hands and were given 
responsibilities in overseeing the household or childcare, female nationals of these emir-
ates now have the assistance of maids, cooks, and drivers to attend to their daily tasks” 
(Rajakumar 2014: 127). Although these women were fortunate enough to have the abili-
ty to purchase any material goods they desire, most of their choices are largely informed 
by familial obligations and opinions. How can female Qataris express personal agency 
in their conservative society? Other than their purchasing power, what has changed for 
female citizens in this wealthy postcolonial state? This balancing act, wherein women 
express their individuality within the strictures of social norms, is performed in other 
aspects of daily life. Qatari women demonstrate their individuality through a myriad of 
3 For example, financing is available to fund a mahram to accompany a female student while she 
pursues training abroad. According to Islamic law, mahram is a male chaperone whom the woman 
cannot marry (i.e. brother, father, grandfather). The state apparatus has implemented a number 
of privileging strategies and codified structural arrangements that target women’s behavior in 
particular, including the inability of Qatari women to grant nationality to their offspring.
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choices, refuting the assumption that covered women are uniformly indistinguishable 
from one another. We set out to answer the above questions in two studies about the lives 
of contemporary Qatari women with a threefold agenda of quantitative online question-
naires, in-person focus groups, and content analysis of legal marriage documents. This 
is done in four steps. First we will discuss how the Qatari state frames gender identity 
and the role of the family in official documents such as the national development goals 
and 2030 vision. Secondly, we sketch out the differences between contemporary fe-
male Qatari students and the experiences of their mothers and grandmothers. Thirdly we 
suggest how an increase in educational opportunities influences post-graduate options 
for female students. We conclude with a discussion of an increasingly educated female 
citizenry manages the often conflicting personal and professional expectations of their 
families and society.
1.1  Gender and the State
The gendering of Qatari society is embedded in consistent references to the nuclear fam-
ily as the building block of the nation. As stated in the Qatari constitution (Article 21): 
“The family is the basis of the society. A Qatari family is founded on religion, ethics, and patriotism. The 
law shall regulate adequate means to protect the family, support its structure, strengthen its ties, and 
protect maternity, childhood, and old age.” (Emphasis added) 
The Qatari family operates as a social and cultural unit from which individuals find 
orientation in the rest of the community and the world. More explicit references to 
fam ily and fertility are found in Qatar’s National Development Strategy Report: “[T]he 
continuity of cohesive families and large households [is] crucial to the national vision.” 
State sponsored programs such as the Qatar Charity “Zawaj,” or “Marriage,” “…offer 
pre-marital counseling and financial assistance to Qatari couples” (quoted in Fenton 
2013). Women’s agency within such a structure is based on gendered expectations and 
restricted by attitudes and mores established by the extended family, including aunts 
and cousins.
The most recent articulation of the next stage in the country’s development is found 
in the Qatar National Vision 2030, which focuses on the four pillars of economic, so-
cial, environmental, and human development. An explicitly stated goal within human 
development is “an educated population” (Pillars of Qatar National Vision 2030 2015). 
This aim is qualified by statements such as “appropriate to each individual’s aspirations 
and abilities” (Pillars of Qatar National Vision 2030 2015). A great deal of money and 
national energy has gone into transforming Qatar into an internationally competitive 
knowledge-based economy through the Qatar Foundation and the development of Edu-
cation City, which currently houses nine universities (six American, one French, one 
British, and one Qatari, as well as other centers for research and industry). The prefer-
ential treatment given to males is not acknowledged in official statements on national 
development, which limits the extent to which women can actualize the promises made 
in the name of development. Qatari men maintain a position of privilege afforded them 
by their society (see Paschyn 2014):
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“Boys grow up knowing that they will inherit family businesses or easily find high-paying government 
or military jobs that may not require a degree. Men have more social freedom than women, which helps 
explain their low university enrollment rates. . . . Boys have their cars, their friends, their own lives. Girls 
don’t get that at all.”
Male privilege is not unique to Qatar (nor indeed the Middle East). Within the GCC 
context, Caryle Murphy deems these differences in male and female attitudes toward 
education and change an “aspiration gap.” Her study of young people in Saudi Arabia 
across a variety of social issues reveals that young Saudi men are also 
“ambivalent about greater opportunities and freedoms for their female peers. They do favor women 
being educated, having careers and participating in public life – but not to the same extent that women 
favor these things. And men are less convinced than women that the sexes should be equal in the 
workforce.” (Murphy 2013: 96)
Qatari women are taking advantage of in-country educational opportunities, while many 
of their male counterparts opt to join the army or police force in lieu of tertiary higher 
education. Entry-level positions in the military and police force offer job security and 
lucrative salaries. These government jobs are available to Qatari men regardless of their 
educational experience. Male employment is assumed rather than pursued by the major-
ity of the population:
“Guaranteed a job in the public sector, fewer men are motivated to attend university as compared to 
women; for example, at Qatar University 75 percent of students are female. According to a 2007 report 
by the government’s Planning Council, Qatari female workers have 14.1 years of education compared 
to 10.7 for male workers.” (Kamrava 2013: 159)
The onus is on Qatari women to juggle the state’s twin aims and their families’ needs 
with their personal aspirations. Female citizens toggle between these conventional so-
cial expectations for them to marry and the privileges afforded them through higher 
education, such as personal autonomy, financial freedom, and broader employment 
pros pects. As such, Qatari women’s success in their expected roles as wife, mother, and 
professional is an indicator of the state’s ability to achieve its human capacity-building 
project, a cornerstone of its development strategy. We seek to understand the ways in 
which various national ventures, including the Qatar National Vision 2030, affect the 
everyday lives of female citizens. Our discussion is based on two related studies inves-
tigating Qatari women’s empowerment as understood through the choices available to 
them when it comes to professionalization and marriage. 
Our qualitative research projects capture the changing social landscape and the im-
pact these shifts are having on traditional Qatari institutions, including women’s em-
ployment and marriage. This article brings together two studies on modern women in 
Qatar that contribute to the extant literature about marriage and the professionalization 
of female Qatari nationals. In a country with one of the highest GDPs in the world, more 
women than men occupy university classrooms, but the reverse is true of professional 
offices. By what measurement, then, can we track female participation in the creation 
and circulation of Qatari nationalism? In examining this, we construct a picture of how 
tertiary-educated Qatari women are balancing the demands of modern and traditional 
roles.
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1.2  Male and Female Students 
The emphasis on developing the education system in Qatar has contributed to provid-
ing citizens with a world-class education. The first girls’ public school was estab lished 
in 1956. When the national university opened in 1973, 93 out of the 150 enrollees 
were women, establishing from the outset a trend for more females than males in the 
classroom. Yet not all women in Qatar participated in undergraduate education even 
a generation ago, as we discovered during the first stage of this study when Qatari 
women indicated their educational levels as well as their mothers’ and both grand-
mothers’. This initial phase of investigation included short, online questionnaires for 
female Qatari respondents in order to glean demographic information about Qatari 
women’s educational levels and marital status compared to that of their mothers as 
well as both maternal and paternal grandmothers. Our respondents indicated that in 
the 1970s, the average age at marriage for brides was 14; in the 1980s 18 to 25; and 
since 2000, over 25. Among the current generation of female Qatari students, pursuing 
a university degree is more pervasive than for their mothers or grandmothers. The 
age at marriage for brides has risen for the generation of university students currently 
enrolled. It is unsurprising then that for every male Qatari undergraduate student there 
are six females enrolled at university (Qatari Ministry of Development Planning and 
Statistics 2015). 
However, this upward trend does not translate into more women in the workforce. 
In most educational systems, those seeking to complete a tertiary-level education do so 
to gain credentials to work after graduation. This is not the case for female Qatari gradu-
ates. While women may have the upper hand in education, life after graduation is full of 
competing obligations. Central to these is finding a man of acceptable stature who wants 
the same type of marriage that a woman does: “Tribal marriages depend, above all, on 
women who uphold the purity of the lineage by not marrying down” (Cooke 2014: 39). 
Negotiating post-marital life is key in a society where the majority of marriages are 
still arranged by relatives, and most women marry someone in their extended family, 
including first cousins. A university-level education may not necessarily translate into 
full-time employment because of familial expectations when it comes to fulfilling the 
roles of wife and mother. As we will demonstrate, Qatari women have also developed 
strategies for articulating their individuality and preference in two other important are-
nas: their professional employment and choice of husband.
2 Methodology
Two research teams comprising a gender specialist, an anthropologist, a historian, and 
undergraduate research assistants wanted to investigate how educated Qatari women 
approach traditional expectations of womanhood. Our multicultural, interdisciplinary 
research team encompasses different specializations and backgrounds, allowing for a 
broader consideration of marriage attitudes in young Qatari women and for a holistic, 
solution-oriented approach to the tasks involved in collecting such personal and con-
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fidential responses. Additionally, the research teams have spent a combined 20 years 
living in GCC countries, which helps to inform the context of their work. 
What, if any, are the advantages of a university-level education? Is there any way to 
adapt the practice of arranged marriages as employed in Qatari society? And if so, what 
were the strategies women use to express their desires regarding postgraduate or post-
marital life? These two qualitative research projects captured first-person reactions to the 
changing social landscape and the impact these shifts are having on traditional Qatari in-
stitutions, namely marriage. The female participants hail from a range of tertiary institu-
tions across Qatar, ranging from coeducational American universities in Education City, 
the female campuses of Qatar University, and the Community College of Qatar. Current 
students at varying stages of their degrees and recent graduates of these institutions were 
recruited on a voluntary basis. The range of institutions reflects a broad socioeconomic 
demographic of women of diverse ages, marital statuses, and educational backgrounds.
All the surveys, interviews, and focus groups for both studies were conducted in 
English, which is the language of instruction used in the various universities and the 
primary language of the research team. In total 629 female Qatari participants aged 18 
years and older were surveyed. Our discussion allows female nationals to give voice to 
their own experiences of juggling societal expectations, cultural traditions, governmen-
tal policies, and initiatives geared specifically to mobilizing Qatari nationals. 
The first project discusses the disparity between the number of women who get an 
education and the number who then go on to participate in the formal workforce after 
university. A total of 274 female university students studying at the national university 
and branch campuses in the capital Doha completed an online questionnaire containing 
52 multiple choice questions and eight open-ended questions. The first 52 questions 
tried to gauge what sort of career plans female Qatari students had prior to graduation; 
whether they wanted to work or study further; what sort of working environment they 
preferred; and whether their home environment was conducive to a working life and, 
if not, what were the sorts of obstacles they faced or thought they would face should 
they start working. The open-ended questions attempted to understand the participants’ 
perspectives on matters like the balance between a marriage and working life. These 
questions solicited more in-depth responses to the initial issues. The data collected was 
then analyzed using Excel to generate a quantitative summary and percentages of the 
different responses. According to the majority of responses, Qatari women have been 
successful in finding ways to seek autonomy outside of mixed-gender work environ-
ments that may be objectionable to their families and spouses. 
The second aspect of this study was a content analysis of three salient categories 
of 62 marriage contracts from a broad range of Qatari families as archival evidence re-
flecting changing bridal expectations. These contracts were translated from Arabic into 
English. Evidence of the shurti, or conditions to the marriage stipulated by the bride, 
indicate the degree of women’s agency while negotiating marriage contracts. During 
the proposal stage of marriage, women are afforded the right by cultural and religious 
practice to stipulate conditions for married life in their marriage contract. The irony, of 
course, is that these rights are based on the principle that a woman must be given an 
opportunity to state her post-marital expectations because as a wife she must respect the 
decisions made by her husband. 
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Comparing these studies allows us to consider the extent to which attitudes toward 
gender identities are changing. We show how improved access to education is a partial 
victory for women because of a lack of postgraduate initiatives aimed at integrating 
wom en into their roles in public life while maintaining their obligations toward their 
fam ilies. Our data and literature examine attitudes of young Qatari university students 
and graduates to modern marriage practices in light of the social and economic changes 
their generation face. Through a qualitative and quantitative approach, the primary and 
sec ondary data investigate the relationship between higher education and attitudes to-
ward marriage and Qatari working women. The collected data expand our understanding 
of the broader topic of gender in the Gulf family, allowing for a deeper consideration of 
social and cultural issues that influence family planning and choice of partner, including 
tribalism, socioeconomic factors, and the role of the family in the negotiation process.
2.1  The Disparity: Education versus Employment 
The online questionnaire was distributed at Qatar University (the national university) 
and the six branch campuses at the Qatar Foundation, including Carnegie Mellon Uni-
versity in Qatar, Weill Cornell Medical College in Qatar, Texas A&M University in 
Qatar, Virginia Commonwealth University in Qatar, Georgetown University in Qatar, 
and Northwestern University in Qatar. The goal of these surveys was to see what factors 
participants mentioned as considerations against pursuing a career. To the degree that 
these were self-imposed, we hoped to gain more insight into the various considerations 
that led to such a decision.
Most of the respondents in the first study show there is a generation of Qatari wom-
en who were very willing to work and who have a positive, uplifting attitude toward 
their prospects in Qatar’s labor force. However, while Qatar has taken positive steps in 
advocating the education of women and has therefore encouraged this positive, career-
oriented mindset, the widening pay gap between Qatari women and men was a danger-
ous factor that seemed to inhibit female workforce participation.
According to the 2011 Qatari labor force survey, “Qatari women are paid 25 to 
50 percent less than men, despite the fact that their working hours are comparable – 
and sometimes higher” (2011: 12). This worrying trend was exacerbated by mindsets 
that encourage occupational segregation, which feeds socially constructed ideas about 
a woman’s supposedly predominant role as a wife and mother. There was also a lack 
of graduate opportunities available to women, as demonstrated by 63 percent of our 
respondents saying they wished to go abroad to engage in further studies. A lack of 
post-undergraduate opportunities, both in terms of vocational training and schooling, 
also seemed antithetical to the Qatari government’s efforts to increase female workforce 
participation. 
All of the 274 Qatari women surveyed across six universities wished to pursue a 
career after graduating, but when asked if they would actually work after graduation, 36 
percent believed they would not. The significance of these results shows how breaking 
societal norms is stigmatized to the extent that women feel they are restricted. Thus, 
while wishing to pursue careers after having received a university education, the surve-
yed women felt they would be unable to do so. It is important to note that the obstacles 
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in the way of Qatari women pursuing careers may not just be externally imposed but 
could stem from internal inhibitions as well. This can be seen in the answers to sub-
sequent questions in the survey, which asked what the participants would do if they had 
to choose between compromising on family life or their career.
When contrasted with family and cultural values, employment did not seem to be 
a priority. Since the majority of the participants chose family life over their career, it 
 seemed that they too subscribed to the traditional idea that women are caregivers, while 
men serve as their family’s breadwinner. However, while this understanding of the differ-
ent roles of men and women does exist, the social construction of gender roles seems to 
not completely obstruct women’s increasing roles in the public sphere. As the frequency 
of modernization initiatives increased, both in the public and private sectors, more wom-
en considered entering the job market. 56 percent of survey participants agreed that it was 
easier for their generation to join the workforce than that of their parents. Their res ponses 
indicate a change in attitudes towards women’s participation in the workforce. 
Another main study aim was to determine Qatari women’s reasons for participating 
in the workforce. Existing data suggested that a large percentage of Qatari women were 
financially well off; thus, their desire to work had little to do with income. This idea was 
reinforced when the participants were asked if they felt their family income influenced 
their decision to work. 71 percent of those surveyed believed their familial income did 
not affect their decision. The participants instead pointed to a different reason for want-
ing financial independence: to empower themselves. Empowerment, for this particular 
socioeconomic class, was not about having more money but more about self-fulfillment. 
Out of our respondents, 62 percent of women felt they needed a job in order to feel 
empowered. 
Career paths generally favored by women included social entrepreneurship, teach-
ing, and participation in professional development programs. 54 percent of our partici-
pants believed that there were certain jobs that could be done only by women and certain 
jobs that could be done only by men. This may be due to occupational self-segregation, 
by which women consider the demands of the roles in the oil industry – including time 
spent offshore on oil rigs, the need to wear form-fitting jumpsuits on-site, and work-
ing with mostly male colleagues – as inappropriate activities for women. Otherwise, 
respond ents were generally positive about their intent to enter the workforce. This 
is  likely the result of the state’s aims to modernize translating into some gains in the 
diversi fication of the workforce, as well as less gender segregation in the private sector. 
While several positives came out of this study, more initiatives are still needed in order 
for the vision of the QNV to be fulfilled. 
2.2  Overcoming Obstacles during Postgraduate Life 
One of the major obstacles cited by female respondents to the questionnaire was the lack 
of female role models and mentee programs: 33 percent of participants indicated that 
the lack of female role models discouraged them from entering the workforce. How-
ever, the few role models present in the public sphere did have considerable impact on 
the younger female generation’s notions of public roles for women. Sheikha Moza bint 
Nasser is the mother of the current emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Khalifa Al Thani, and wife 
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of the former emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani, who was emir from 1995 until 
2013. She is consistently one of the female Qatari leaders other Qataris mention when 
asked about role models. In her years as chairperson of the Qatar Foundation, Sheika 
Moza oversaw the establishment of Qatar-based American branch campuses and Euro-
pean accredited graduate programs. Having educational programs based in their own 
country allowed large numbers of Qatari women to receive international degrees by 
sidestepping the taboo of traveling abroad (Anderson 2015). Other female role models 
that women identified included their own mothers and senior female members of their 
household, which 81 percent of respondents did. As long as family pressure to get mar-
ried and stay at home subsided, many women believed they had the potential to pursue 
a career outside the home. 
The lack of training programs designed specifically for female professional develop-
ment was another major obstacle respondents mentioned they repeatedly encountered 
when they sought employment after graduation. From a young age, girls were refused 
opportunities awarded to their male counterparts. Few young girls were exposed to work 
in technical fields such as engineering, computer science, and medicine. Once again, 
occupational segregation may prevent women from pursuing their interests, as 54 per-
cent of those surveyed believed there were certain jobs specifically created for men and 
women. This reiterated the idea that gender segregation has been largely encouraged in 
Qatari society. Shareefa Fadel’s study on vertical occupational segregation indicated 80 
percent of Qatari families believed in gender segregation as a benefit for the social well-
being of their daughters (quoted in Paschyn 2014). 
Qatari women’s motivations for professionalizing extend beyond financial remuner-
ation. In fact, 71 percent of those surveyed believed income did not affect their decision 
to work. Jobs taken on by women are not necessarily male dominated but are ones that 
best suit their interests. Homegrown businesses and local start-ups were some of the 
short-term careers women pursued independently. For many young women with degrees 
empowerment meant pursuing their dreams. Of those surveyed, 62 percent believed 
they needed a job to feel empowered. Many have accepted the fact that roles for men 
and women are different in society. Now economic independence and limited social 
freedoms have driven many women to pursue a career.
3 Educated and Empowered
The second study in our discussion demonstrates that educated women do reap other 
benefits that can enhance their lifelong empowerment. One of the main questions 
 asked during focus-group interviews in the second study was whether respondents had 
 noticed any difference between what university-educated brides-to-be demanded in con-
tracts and what others asked for. The general responses indicated that participants felt 
some one with a university education was more likely to be “aware of her rights.” One 
respond ent even suggested that those who were getting married at a younger age were 
doing so because they had no aspirations apart from marriage. Another subjective rea-
son  given for earlier marriages was that women who married at 18 or a little older felt 
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they could get more freedom after marriage, while a woman aged 23 realizes she will 
have more  responsibilities to deal with (Rajakumar, personal interview, June 25, 2014). 
It is interest ing to note, however, that the respondents in this interview were quoted 
as saying that women sometimes had more freedom to do things such as travel and 
 drive after marrying. Thus, even while a woman might have been prevented from doing 
 certain things in her own family, her marriage might be a liberating space for her. 
At the heart of differences between university graduates and other females is how 
they approach marriage proposals. Among the sample in the second study, 20 brides in-
dicated in their marriage contracts that they wished to study, to live apart from in-laws, 
or to be permitted to work after marrying. The reason the women cite these conditions 
can be traced directly to their goals of educational advancement. While asking to be able 
to continue further studies after marriage is important in and of itself, it is also symboli-
cally important since it grants the Qatari woman an identity separate from her husband 
and his family. Her ability to study and work after marrying points to the possibility of 
greater economic independence in the future. The request for a neolocal house – apart 
from the in-laws, as is the custom in Qatari society – is also an indication of independ-
ence from the extended family. 
One hundred and fifty female focus-group participants in the second study were also 
asked to indicate whether there were any differences between the post-marital expecta-
tions of university-educated women and those of high school graduates. Their answers 
largely indicated that university graduates are more likely to negotiate the conditions of 
their post-marital life – though this right is religiously applicable to any bride, regardless 
of her educational status:
I:  Do university graduates ask for something different than girls who didn’t go to university or who 
are not yet in university?
P5:  But she might be more educated, so she will ask for guarantees. 
P3:  Because she is more educated, so maybe she is more aware about her rights. So she would, she 
would say, “I want to have that.” But the one, non-educated, “Okay, it is just marriage,” she’s not 
aware.
P5:  For example, to ask, “Can I drive, can I . . . ?”
P1:  “Yeah, I want a maid.” It could be written in the contract. “I want a separate house from my in-
laws.”
P5:  About the work and about the study, and about even the driving, it happens. 
P3:  Most of them [brides and their families] don’t write that.
P3:  Because men believe in other men’s word. (Rajakumar, personal interview, May 25, 2014)
Women using the marriage contract to defend their rights and interests is an established 
practice in the Muslim world. The Islamic marriage contract is a legally binding con-
tract between a husband and his wife that needs to be signed by two witnesses. In order 
to understand the relevance of the marriage contract to women’s empowerment, it is 
important to know what the marriage contract usually includes. Marriage contracts in 
the GCC are considered a private affair between the wife, the husband, and their im-
mediate families (Wynn 2009: 210). Each party determines its own contractual condi-
tions, which are then subject to negotiation. Typical conditions stipulate the post-marital 
residence, wheth er the wife agrees to her husband having additional wives, and divorce 
settlements. Brides may also specify a range of behaviors that they hope to continue 
after marriage, including driving, completing their education, or working in a mixed-
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gender environment. Contracts also include a place to indicate the “bride wealth,” com-
monly referred to as the dowry, that is to be given to the wife by her husband. Feminist 
historian Amira El-Azhary Sonbol challenges the assumption that “marriage in Islam is 
an unequal relationship in which the man has full agency and the woman has very little” 
by tracing the evolution of the marriage contract through the pre-Islamic Egyptian era 
to the Ottoman era and then on to contemporary times (Sonbol 2009: 88). Marriage 
contracts have traditionally, and in contemporary times, been used to “gradually shift 
[women’s] role in socio-economic discourse” in Qatar as in other parts of the Arab world 
(Sonbol 2009: 87). However, the family “still plays an important role in mediating the 
woman’s demands in her life after marriage” (Sonbol 2009: 87). The interplay between 
the bride, her male relatives, and the groom’s willingness to accept her conditions is 
what we will focus on in this part of the discussion, though the marriage contract is the 
final step in a series of complicated criteria for Qatari partner selection. If brides and 
grooms engage in the give and take of negotiating specific details of their post-marital 
lives during the engagement process, this may be a dynamic of exchange that sets the 
tone for the marriage. The possibilities for spousal autonomy and agency increase in a 
neolocal home, where couples are shielded from shared living spaces with parents or 
members of the extended family.
3.1  The Right to Ask: Islamic Marriage Contracts
We collected and conducted content analysis on 62 marriage contracts. The marriage 
contracts are official civic documents registered with the Ministry of Justice and written 
in formal Arabic. Two key areas were translated into English by a native speaker of 
Arabic. The two aspects of the contract most relevant to our discourse are (a) the condi-
tions that the bride sets for marriage and (b) the bride wealth, or goods and monies she 
receives at the time of her marriage. Both of these determine the amount of autonomy 
and input the bride could potentially have in her marriage. 
The conditions for the marriage are known as shurut, and the money or possessions 
given by the groom or his family to the bride as her property  is known as mahar. There 
is also the muaj’aal, or area where the couple can indicate a divorce settlement in case 
the marriage is terminated. The spaces for each of these specific terms are left blank on 
the form that legally records the marriage. In most cases, the corresponding entries for 
the mahar and the muajaal are numerical values. As regards the shurti, people use sen-
tence fragments that outline specific conditions related to post-marital life.
We also conducted brief follow-up interviews with our respondents to clarify certain 
provisions in the contracts. In many instances our interviewees were reluctant to reveal 
all the information in the contracts and the conditions stipulated in them, especially the 
amount of the mahar. We used a snowball sampling, beginning with students enrolled in 
universities at the Qatar Foundation and expanding outward into their network because 
of the private nature of Qatari society and the personal nature of our questions. We invit-
ed participants by email, word of mouth, and surveys in university classrooms. Those 
whom we were referred to via sisters, cousins, or close friends, were the most willing to 
disclose particulars about marital negotiations. The further out in the referral circle we 
went, particularly with interviewees who were acquaintances of our initial respondents, 
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the more difficult it was to gather specific details about the engagement process. How-
ever, despite this reluctance to offer information, almost all the respondents listed two 
demands that had become common among most women who had received a university 
education: the guarantee that they would be able to finish their studies and/or to work 
after marrying.
A contemporary shift in the conditions stipulated by the bride and her family in 
the marriage is also evident. Ten of the contracts in our sample of 62 were from the 
1970s. During this time, none of the women who married after turning 21 stipulated 
conditions in their contracts. Since marriage at later ages for women was much rarer in 
this period, it might have been difficult to stipulate further conditions in the marriage 
contract. In 1998, one bride (out of the five contracts collected in this period) put in 
writing that continuing her education was a precondition for the marriage. After 2000, 
only one participant in our sample was 19 when she got married. Of the 16 contracts 
dated between 2000 and 2010 in our sample, one bride requested that the couple live 
in their own house, while two indicated their preference for working after marrying, 
and three women said they would like to complete their university degrees. Also, in 
this ten-year period in our sample, eight of the contracts had no conditions at all and 
two respondents indicated that their conditions were agreed verbally with the groom 
and his family. The major difference in contracts can be seen between 2011 and 2013, 
the last year of our sample, when brides listed more than one condition. Of the 20 con-
tracts concluded in this period the most frequent request was to complete university 
studies; interestingly, as the average age rose to 23 in this period, two brides requested 
the right to continue working. Two brides also requested their own house along with 
being able to complete their studies, and one bride made three requests – to finish her 
degree, have her own home, and work after marriage. While these changes may be 
small, they do demonstrate a tangible shift in the bridal conditions stipulated over a 
43-year period.
4 Family Tradition
While the brides’ demands in the contracts were progressive and reflected a desire for 
more autonomy, they were still shaped by their parents’ wishes. For example, while 
brides asked for conditions such as being allowed to drive or work, these conditions had 
to be preapproved by the family. One respondent said she needed her father to “confirm 
that he allowed [her] to drive”, even to obtain a license, while another said, “you cannot 
even work in your career without your father’s consent.” This suggests that the women 
who make bolder, more empowering demands in their contracts are ones who already 
had some level of autonomy in their pre-marriage lives. The terms of the contract are 
debated and decided by the bride’s family and the groom’s family as opposed to an 
understanding being reached only between the bride and the groom – thus the bride’s 
family dictates the sort of freedom the bride can demand from her husband, limiting her 
freedom in a fundamental sense:
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P:  But just to go back to the contract, I think a lot of fathers do put things for their daughters . . . 
you know some fathers say to the husband: “If you happen to marry a second wife, this and this 
happens. If you happen to divorce, she can raise the kids until a certain age.” Some fathers do this 
just to protect their daughters because they know how things are. He might, you know, he might 
ask to include some things.
I: What kind of fathers are those? Are those more legally minded or do they have lots of daughters, 
or how would you categorize them?
P:  I think those are the kind of fathers that are in more the traditional kind of jobs, but more conven-
tional workplaces.
I:  Government employees? Why do you think that would be? 
P:  They hear a lot of stories. (Rajakumar, personal interview, March 3, 2014)
Her family’s influence shapes many of the decisions a Qatari woman makes, particularly 
with regard to her marital and professional choices. Such influence and the factors that 
underline social customs are largely absent from national discourse but abundant in 
widely circulated notions of acceptable social codes.
4.1 Conclusion and Further Studies
Across our samples, participants repeatedly noted a discrepancy in their lived experi-
ence as opposed to the state’s aims for Qatari society, according to which women are to 
“increase their role in all sectors of their country’s economy” (Pillars of Qatar National 
Vision 2030 2015). While it is not possible to claim a causal relationship between higher 
education as the cause of delayed marriage and decreased fertility rates, a relationship is 
emerging between higher education and Qatari women’s aspirations. Continued study of 
these factors, soliciting women’s experiences and offering evidence-based data are es-
sential to understanding the complexities of the pressures of modern cosmopolitanism. 
For the women in our study, the dominant social expectation is for female citizens 
to take their place as wives and mothers in the nuclear family. In Qatari society, where 
familial alliances and relationships are cemented through kinship, personal choices are 
informed by one’s larger network, particularly for women. In such a scenario, choices 
such as one’s field or place of work have important social ramifications. The institution 
of marriage maintains and reinforces a myriad of social expectations in this patrilo-
cal, patrilineal society. Despite Qatar’s recent and rapid physical and socioeconomic 
devel opment, familial influence continues to play a central role in women’s choices. Al-
though efforts to optimize the Qatari labor force have necessitated the greater inclusion 
of women in the public sphere, as is the case elsewhere, a patriarchal, gendered attitude 
toward females still prevails. 
Nor is Qatar the only GCC nation to address these concerns on a national level. 
Much of the established and current research about the Arabian Gulf focuses on Ku-
wait and Saudi Arabia. These two countries were among the first to develop their oil 
infrastructure a decade or so prior to the discovery of oil in the United Arab Emirates 
or Qatar. Yet the pressures to marry for the sake of the nation are echoed in Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia. National campaigns in both of these countries explicitly urge young 
people to marry and contribute to the stability of the nation. In what ways do these direct 
campaigns affect Saudi and Kuwaiti female agency? 
Tangible state intervention in marriage practices includes the Kuwaiti “Mar riage 
 Comes First” campaign in 2012 which encouraged young citizens not to delay marriage 
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 (Fattora 2012; Saligram & Moussa 2013). The campaign responded to a 10 percent de-
crease in marriage rates among Kuwaitis and a resulting decrease in fertility.4 “Marriage 
Comes First” encouraged Kuwaitis to “think about matrimony before material goods, 
studying, a career, travelling or having fun with friends.” Kuwait is not the only GCC 
country to be concerned about the number of delayed marriages, the overall decrease 
in marriage rates, and the related decrease in fertility rates. Other GCC countries have 
launched sim ilar campaigns to encourage its young citizens to marry earlier, offering 
more tangible assistance with the practicalities of getting married, such as dowry pay-
ments for the bride. Saudi Arabia has “specialized government entities that advo cate 
against costly traditional marriages and facilitate ‘mahr and shabka’ for youth who 
wants to marry” (Rashad 2015: 15). The state’s willingness to provide financial as-
sistance to citizens wishing to marry is an overt attempt at social engineering that needs 
further study – particularly to understand the ways in which such programs shape Saudi 
women’s agency. Students in particular are targeted.  The King Abdul Aziz Universi-
ty, for instance, has also begun a project called “Tayseer el Zawaj,” or Facilitation of 
Marriage, under the umbrella of its Scientific Fund Agency (Rashad 2015: 15). The im-
mediacy and contemporary nature of these campaigns demonstrate the ongoing attempts 
to define Gulf women’s participation in the nation through traditional gender roles. How 
do Kuwaiti women reconcile competing demands for professionalization and marriage? 
Are there similarities to the strategies used by Qatari women? These are some of the 
questions that could be investigated in future comparative studies.
Feminist scholars studying such trends in Saudi Arabia have established a body of 
research from which we can expand to break apart notions of a monolithic Gulf experi-
ence (Doumato 2003; Pouseny/Doumato 200; Le Renard 2014). Many of the trends we 
currently see in Qatari society Dumato explored in the context of female experiences in 
Saudi Arabia. She traces the rise in citizen affluence and increased mobility for women 
through education. Her work, and that of others, examines the advantages and chal-
lenges modernization brings women in the Arab world vis-a-vi globalization (Pfeifer/ 
Pousney 26). Feminist scholars have pointed out the need to interrogate the ways in 
which we examine women’s agency in the GCC, using the case of Saudi women as an 
example of hypersexualizing and moral superiority by the media but also by scholars 
(Le Renard vii). In this discussion we aim to understand Qatari women’s lived experi-
ences through their own words and within the context of their society.
Expanded studies of gender roles in this region would benefit from a comparative 
approach, contrasting the social development of Qatari women alongside their coun-
terparts in the GCC as well as the wider Middle East. Studies into modernization and 
gender in the United Arab Emirates also represent an emerging body of scholarship that 
will contribute to the ongoing examination of women’s experiences. Going forward, 
longitudinal studies of female GCC nationals, from their university years through to 
their employment experiences, would also be useful in tracking how an individual’s 
goals are supported or overridden by the larger social structures. 
4 In 2011 there were 359 marriages per 100 000 inhabitants, a 10 percent decrease compared to 
2007, according to figures from the Ministry of Justice. See “Marriage Loses Its Sparkle in Kuwait”, 
access at www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/10/us-kuwait-marriage-idUSBRE8990XP20121010. 
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